Wednesday, 28 October 2015

Appendix 2 - The collapse of the Lehman Brothers

It has been over 7 years since the astonishing collapse of one of the world’s largest banks shook the global financial system. Having only been 15 years old at the time, I did not fully understand the enormity of the problem. One thing that sticks in my mind, how could a bank the size of Lehman Brothers be allowed to fall?

Having watched the ‘The Last Days of the Lehman Brothers’ documentary, it helped me to understand the underlying issues which led to the bank to collapse and consequently file for bankruptcy. The investment bank had deliberately overstated the value of its assets, such as the collateralised debt obligations (CBO’s). When you combine this with the US subprime mortgage housing crisis, Lehman brothers faced a $25 billion hole, seemingly in the eyes of the bank, out of nowhere.

$25 billion is not exactly a sum which could quite easily go unnoticed, is it? Surely one of 25,000 employees should have picked up on this well before it became too late. Once the bank noticed they were in trouble, they had to write down their commercial real estate assets from $40 billion, to $33 billion and the banks rating was also downgraded. Not looking pretty is it? Yet the company had carried on doing what they were doing as though there were no issues, until it was too late.

Global insurance giant, AIG, were another company that got into difficulty. They had decided to maximise profits to trade in credit default swaps, until the mortgages that were tied to those swaps began to regularly default. The firm were running out of cash to cover their losses and asked the Government for an emergency loan to cover these losses, believed to be worth $40bilion. The difference between this situation and the one Lehman brothers found themselves in, as reported by the BBC at the time, was that allowing AIG to fall would directly affect millions of consumers and companies around the word and therefore they were deemed too big to be allowed to collapse.

Having already rescued other private companies, it was becoming less and less acceptable for the Government to continue bail out firms. The US Treasury refused to give UK bank, Barclays, a guarantee for Lehman’s trading obligations which consequently led to the deal falling through. In doing this, the US Treasury made a statement, saying that they were unwilling to use public money to rescue banks that had got themselves in this mess.

Some people may think this is a sceptical view; however I believe the Government took the view that no organisation was too big to fail and if avoidable mistakes had been made, then they needed to be prepared to face the consequences. In comparison to AIG, Lehman Brothers were in a different position. In order to even enter discussions with Barclays, they realised that they needed to take on $25 billion of bad debts. As well as the current issue of being illiquid, the bank didn’t have the assets to be able to pay off their long term debts.

Looking back on the financial crisis, it is clear in my eyes that the vastly unregulated firms got too far ahead of themselves, seeming thinking that they would be fine no matter what happened. Merrill Lynch were another Bank who fell into difficulty, and were ultimately rescued rather controversially by the Bank of America in $50 billion deal. These banks had all over stated what they had and as a result successfully made millions through over inflated share prices. However, the success was short lived as it was only a matter of time until this caught up with them and as a result almost wiped out the entire industry.

At the end of the day, the issue stemmed from whoever believed it was a good idea to approve these mortgages, without realising that these people would be unable to pay the banks back. Someone within the industry must have looked into this lending and surely thought we could be in trouble here. Was it just a case of it being too little too late by the time Lehman Brothers realised? Can a bank like this not know how many bad debts they possess, and honestly not realise how many mortgages were going to default as well not realising how deadly these CDO’s would turn out to be? I for one am certainly not convinced, someone somewhere must have known something.

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